Though the likelihood of
a US attack on Syria has recently been substantially reduced, it is still
enough of a possibility that Americans should still be concerned about its
occurrence, whether they are for it or against it. I am personally opposed to such
an attack, at least as the situation stands today. There are two basic reasons
for my opposition. First, such an attack would not be in furtherance or defense
of any vital US interest, which should always be the first issue in any use of
US military force. Second, even if successful, such an attack is likelier to
have a negative than a positive impact on US national security.
Historically the US has
had six major foreign policy goals, three of which have been pursued since the
country’s founding and three which are comparatively recent in time. They are:
1) to obtain and maintain control over as large a swathe of land on the North
American continent as is feasible; 2) to be the strongest country in the
Western Hemisphere, if not a hemispheric hegemon; 3) to maintain the ability of
American ships and commerce to freely traverse the world’s seas; 4) to ensure
that no state secures a hegemonic position in Eurasia; 5) to maintain US access
to cheap and reliable sources of energy; and 6) to obtain the reduction of
barriers to the free flow of goods, services, and capital across international
borders. Since the end of the Cold War three other major goals have been added
to the list. They are: 1) to promote the spread of democracy and market-based
economies; 2) to counter the use of terrorism, especially international
terrorism; and 3) to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
There are other, less important goals that the US has pursued or is currently
pursuing, but these nine make up the major goals that have driven or that
currently drive US foreign policy.
Of the nine foreign
policy goals stated above, only the most recent three are truly implicated in
the Syrian civil war. US involvement in the war could be a move in furtherance
of US interests if we were able to: 1) get a democratically elected regime in
place in Damascus that 2) governed Syria in a liberal manner (i.e., protected
the rights of all of Syria’s people, not just one sectarian or ideological
group, and permitted such groups to have a voice in government) and that 3)
agreed to destroy, under international supervision, whatever WMD programs Assad
might currently have.
Of course, the above
results would almost of necessity require a major Western, and predominantly
US, invasion and occupation of Syria. So, the limited strikes that President
Obama has been contemplating unleashing on Assad’s forces are far below the
level of action that would be required to get that done. And any notion that
the US is about to attempt another Iraq scenario in Syria is patently
ridiculous at this point. Not only does Obama have no intention of trying that,
but there’s almost no way at this point that he could get it through Congress.
So, if the limited
strikes that Obama is contemplating wouldn’t be enough to further a major
foreign policy goal of the US, what then is Obama trying to accomplish? Taking
him at his word, the attack would have two goals: 1) to punish the regime for
its use of chemical weapons and 2) to deter Syria or other states from using
such weapons in the future. Assuming that such goals are in the interest of the
US, is such an attack likely to achieve them? The answer to that question
regarding the first goal is: Maybe; the answer regarding the second one is: Not
likely.
Whether such an attack
would successfully punish the Assad regime depends on what is meant by
“punish.” Clearly Obama doesn’t mean by this that the attack should be such
that it either kills Assad or causes him to lose power, because then the idea
of deterring him from future chemical weapons use would have no meaning. But he
also isn’t talking about simply killing Assad’s soldiers because, while Assad
doesn’t necessarily view them as cannon fodder—he doesn’t, after all, have a
limitless supply of them—he’s already decided to throw them into the fire of
combat, so losing a few hundred of them would likely be an acceptable outcome
of being able to use chemical weapons against the rebels. But taking out some
of the equipment that Assad has been using to attack rebels might be another
matter, especially aircraft. This might be a successful punishment of Assad,
and is something that would likely be the focus of any such attack. Such
equipment, however, can be easily replaced by Russia.
The deterrence aspect
of Obama’s plan is, however, very likely to fail. It’s not as if Assad doesn’t
already know about the taboo that exists against using chemical weapons. For
him to make the decision to use them anyway—and in spite of the warning that
Obama issued last year—means that he believes himself to be in a pretty
desperate situation. (This, of course, assumes that it was in fact Assad who
ordered the use of such weapons and that his military hasn’t gone rogue or that
it wasn’t the rebels who used the weapons in the hope of forcing the hand of
the US.) The kind of attack that’s being contemplated on Syria isn’t likely to
move the needle much, if at all, when it comes to the calculations of Assad’s,
and other chemically-armed, regimes facing the type of all-or-nothing rebellion
that Assad is up against. Dictators like Assad will do what they have to do to
survive. You don’t become or remain a dictator by being easily dissuaded from
doing bad things to innocent people.
If the worst that would
come of an attack on Syria is that the goal of punishing Assad will likely not
be much of a success or easily undone by Russian, Iranian, and/or Hezbollah
assistance and the goal of deterring future use of chemical weapons is likely
to only be marginally successful, then attacking Syria might actually be worth
it because of the issue of US credibility that has been put in play by the
administration’s admonishments to Assad about using chemical weapons. But, in
reality, there is a much worse outcome to such an attack that provides a very
strong argument against launching it, and that is that it might actually be “too
successful” and, therefore, very bad for the US.
By “too successful” I
mean that a US-led attack on Syria might be so damaging to Assad’s war machine
and the morale of his soldiers that it could tip the very precarious balance
that currently exists between the Syrian military and the rebels in favor of
the rebels. This might seem to be a curious thing to think would be bad for the
US, but the Syrian civil war isn’t being waged in Middle-earth; it isn’t really
a fight pitting good rebels against an evil regime. Yes, the Assad regime is
evil, but so are the strongest rebel groups fighting against it. Any notion
that the “moderate” rebel factions would gain power from a rebel victory is nothing
more than a pipe dream. All a rebel victory would do is exchange one kind of
evil for another, the kind that would be much more inclined to attack US
interests and citizens either directly or by supporting international terrorist
organizations. Not only that, but the jihadists, in this case, would also be
able to lay their hands on the Syrian arsenal of high tech weaponry, including
Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile.
So while it would be in
the interests of the US to remove the Assad regime from power, that foreign
policy goal doesn’t exist in a vacuum. The US government must make its
decisions about Syria with an eye on what is likely to follow Assad before it
engages in any action that furthers his removal from power. As the situation
now stands, that consideration weighs strongly in favor of not doing anything
to tip the scales in favor of the rebels, which includes the shipment of small
arms to the rebels, which are highly likely to wind up in the hands of the
jihadist groups.
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