Why Attacking Syria Would Be a Mistake

Though the likelihood of a US attack on Syria has recently been substantially reduced, it is still enough of a possibility that Americans should still be concerned about its occurrence, whether they are for it or against it. I am personally opposed to such an attack, at least as the situation stands today. There are two basic reasons for my opposition. First, such an attack would not be in furtherance or defense of any vital US interest, which should always be the first issue in any use of US military force. Second, even if successful, such an attack is likelier to have a negative than a positive impact on US national security.

Historically the US has had six major foreign policy goals, three of which have been pursued since the country’s founding and three which are comparatively recent in time. They are: 1) to obtain and maintain control over as large a swathe of land on the North American continent as is feasible; 2) to be the strongest country in the Western Hemisphere, if not a hemispheric hegemon; 3) to maintain the ability of American ships and commerce to freely traverse the world’s seas; 4) to ensure that no state secures a hegemonic position in Eurasia; 5) to maintain US access to cheap and reliable sources of energy; and 6) to obtain the reduction of barriers to the free flow of goods, services, and capital across international borders. Since the end of the Cold War three other major goals have been added to the list. They are: 1) to promote the spread of democracy and market-based economies; 2) to counter the use of terrorism, especially international terrorism; and 3) to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There are other, less important goals that the US has pursued or is currently pursuing, but these nine make up the major goals that have driven or that currently drive US foreign policy.

Of the nine foreign policy goals stated above, only the most recent three are truly implicated in the Syrian civil war. US involvement in the war could be a move in furtherance of US interests if we were able to: 1) get a democratically elected regime in place in Damascus that 2) governed Syria in a liberal manner (i.e., protected the rights of all of Syria’s people, not just one sectarian or ideological group, and permitted such groups to have a voice in government) and that 3) agreed to destroy, under international supervision, whatever WMD programs Assad might currently have.

Of course, the above results would almost of necessity require a major Western, and predominantly US, invasion and occupation of Syria. So, the limited strikes that President Obama has been contemplating unleashing on Assad’s forces are far below the level of action that would be required to get that done. And any notion that the US is about to attempt another Iraq scenario in Syria is patently ridiculous at this point. Not only does Obama have no intention of trying that, but there’s almost no way at this point that he could get it through Congress.

So, if the limited strikes that Obama is contemplating wouldn’t be enough to further a major foreign policy goal of the US, what then is Obama trying to accomplish? Taking him at his word, the attack would have two goals: 1) to punish the regime for its use of chemical weapons and 2) to deter Syria or other states from using such weapons in the future. Assuming that such goals are in the interest of the US, is such an attack likely to achieve them? The answer to that question regarding the first goal is: Maybe; the answer regarding the second one is: Not likely.

Whether such an attack would successfully punish the Assad regime depends on what is meant by “punish.” Clearly Obama doesn’t mean by this that the attack should be such that it either kills Assad or causes him to lose power, because then the idea of deterring him from future chemical weapons use would have no meaning. But he also isn’t talking about simply killing Assad’s soldiers because, while Assad doesn’t necessarily view them as cannon fodder—he doesn’t, after all, have a limitless supply of them—he’s already decided to throw them into the fire of combat, so losing a few hundred of them would likely be an acceptable outcome of being able to use chemical weapons against the rebels. But taking out some of the equipment that Assad has been using to attack rebels might be another matter, especially aircraft. This might be a successful punishment of Assad, and is something that would likely be the focus of any such attack. Such equipment, however, can be easily replaced by Russia.

The deterrence aspect of Obama’s plan is, however, very likely to fail. It’s not as if Assad doesn’t already know about the taboo that exists against using chemical weapons. For him to make the decision to use them anyway—and in spite of the warning that Obama issued last year—means that he believes himself to be in a pretty desperate situation. (This, of course, assumes that it was in fact Assad who ordered the use of such weapons and that his military hasn’t gone rogue or that it wasn’t the rebels who used the weapons in the hope of forcing the hand of the US.) The kind of attack that’s being contemplated on Syria isn’t likely to move the needle much, if at all, when it comes to the calculations of Assad’s, and other chemically-armed, regimes facing the type of all-or-nothing rebellion that Assad is up against. Dictators like Assad will do what they have to do to survive. You don’t become or remain a dictator by being easily dissuaded from doing bad things to innocent people.

If the worst that would come of an attack on Syria is that the goal of punishing Assad will likely not be much of a success or easily undone by Russian, Iranian, and/or Hezbollah assistance and the goal of deterring future use of chemical weapons is likely to only be marginally successful, then attacking Syria might actually be worth it because of the issue of US credibility that has been put in play by the administration’s admonishments to Assad about using chemical weapons. But, in reality, there is a much worse outcome to such an attack that provides a very strong argument against launching it, and that is that it might actually be “too successful” and, therefore, very bad for the US.

By “too successful” I mean that a US-led attack on Syria might be so damaging to Assad’s war machine and the morale of his soldiers that it could tip the very precarious balance that currently exists between the Syrian military and the rebels in favor of the rebels. This might seem to be a curious thing to think would be bad for the US, but the Syrian civil war isn’t being waged in Middle-earth; it isn’t really a fight pitting good rebels against an evil regime. Yes, the Assad regime is evil, but so are the strongest rebel groups fighting against it. Any notion that the “moderate” rebel factions would gain power from a rebel victory is nothing more than a pipe dream. All a rebel victory would do is exchange one kind of evil for another, the kind that would be much more inclined to attack US interests and citizens either directly or by supporting international terrorist organizations. Not only that, but the jihadists, in this case, would also be able to lay their hands on the Syrian arsenal of high tech weaponry, including Assad’s chemical weapons stockpile.

So while it would be in the interests of the US to remove the Assad regime from power, that foreign policy goal doesn’t exist in a vacuum. The US government must make its decisions about Syria with an eye on what is likely to follow Assad before it engages in any action that furthers his removal from power. As the situation now stands, that consideration weighs strongly in favor of not doing anything to tip the scales in favor of the rebels, which includes the shipment of small arms to the rebels, which are highly likely to wind up in the hands of the jihadist groups.